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- 2. To provide accurate information about Nazi Germany for use throughout Great Britain, the British Empire, the U.S.A., Europe and wherever the English tongue is known.

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY

as stated in "Mein Kampf"

Ву

94092 F915 ADOLF HITLER.

With a Foreword by

THE DUCHESS OF ATHOLL M.P.

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NOTE.

The Duchess of Atholl, M.P., who contributes the Foreword to this documented study of what Herr Hitler has written in his autobiography about foreign policy and international relations, was Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education of England and Wales in the Conservative Administration of 1924–29. Her twelve years in the House of Commons have won a recognised place for her in what concerns education and those who have crossed swords with her in debate know how indefatigably she works to arrive at the facts in regard to any question she discusses. She has never been officially concerned with foreign affairs, except when she attended the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1925 as a substitute delegate. This Foreword therefore owes nothing to any official suggestion.

In earlier years she devoted much time to musical study, and few things bring her greater enjoyment than German music.

FOREWORD

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In three other pamphlets of this series, extracts from "Mein Kampf" have illustrated respectively the development of Herr Hitler's personality and his teaching in regard to racialism and religion. This fourth pamphlet gathers together the main passages in which he sets forth his foreign policy.

For us in Great Britain the importance of these extracts is plain. How Germany is governed internally is a matter primarily for the Germans. The Nazi regime may have brought some benefits to Germany; it has also brought changes which few in this country can view without concern; but to us what matters most is the way Herr Hitler looks upon the rest of the world.

And in these extracts it is revealed with astounding candour. Never can a modern statesman have made so startlingly clear to his readers his ambitions for the aggrandisement of his people. He derides the suggestion that Germany should think it worth while to fight merely to recover her pre-1914 frontiers. The Third Reich must include Austria and all Continental peoples of Germanic race. This, he declares, is the only policy that would justify the sacrifice of German blood; and only by the power of a mighty sword can this policy be successfully pursued.

Nor is this all. France must be destroyed, and to this end she must first be isolated. No sacrifice should therefore be too great to secure for Germany the friendship of any Power that finds unbearable what Herr Hitler describes as France's "lust for

domination" on the Continent of Europe. The Allies he hopes to secure for the fulfilment of his policy are Britain and Italy.

Yet, again, the crushing of France is only to be the means of securing German territorial expansion in other directions. Within a century "80" millions of Germans must increase to 250 millions. And the "new soil" for them must, in the first place, be won in Russia and the border States under her rule. A policy of "land settlement" is hardly possible save in Europe. "It could not be carried out in such a place as the Cameroons."

Such, in brief, is the policy here revealed with rare frankness and crudity.

For its achievement, it is explicitly stated, considerations of religion and humanity must be set aside, and diplomacy must not be scrupulous in its methods.

Moreover, "the bigger a lie, the more quickly it will be believed" (see page 11).

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It is sometimes urged that Mein Kampf is out of date, that its publication began some years ago, and that many statesmen who advocated extreme policies in their youth have found it necessary to modify them when faced in after years with the responsibilities of office.

But in such circumstances responsible public men are usually glad to let their former utterances sink into oblivion. Mein Kampf, on the contrary, has been assiduously pressed on the German people ever since Herr Hitler became Chancellor on January 30th, 1933. Government officials were promptly required to have a copy on their tables. On December 11th, 1933, the Völkischer Beobachter, Herr Hitler's personal newspaper, extolled the book as containing "for the present and for the future the final principles of National-Socialism, of which it is the very essence. It should become the Bible of the German people." By 1935 its circulation had reached 2,130,000 copies, a figure

which must by now have been greatly exceeded, as last Christmas German industrialists were required to give a copy to each of their employees. More recently still, on April 21st, 1936, three weeks after the publication of Herr Hitler's "Peace Plan," the German press announced that the Reich Minister of the Interior had issued instructions that, from May 1st onwards, the civil authorities were to present a copy of the book to all newly-married couples, provided that the husband was of German nationality, and that neither spouse was a Jew.

And every one of the passages here cited appears in recent editions. In particular, they are to be found in the copy of one of the 1935 editions officially presented by the late German Ambassador, Herr von Hoesch, just before his death in April, 1936, to the British Branch of the All Peoples' Association. This, surely, sets the official seal conclusively on the policy laid down in Mein Kampf.

Nor should it be overlooked that when asked by Monsieur Bertrand de Jouvenel, in a recent authorised interview, to reinforce the expressions of friendship for France then expressed by expunging the Francophobe passages from Mein Kampf, Herr Hitler refused to do so, saying that he would do the correcting by his foreign policy, "which is based on Franco-German understanding." He went on to explain the violence of Mein Kampf by stating that it had been written when he was in prison; that at this period the French were occupying the Ruhr, and that there was great tension between the two countries.*

Here the Chancellor's memory unfortunately failed him. The first volume may have been written during his imprisonment—light imprisonment for nine months in 1924. But on the last page of the second volume—and it is in this volume that the statements on foreign policy are chiefly to be found—

^{*}Paris Soir, 28th February, 1936, and Journal of the German Association for League of Nations Questions, April 17th, 1936.

the author himself states that he is writing in November, 1926. This was some two years after his captivity had ended; more than two years after German reparations had been reduced by the Dawes plan; and more than a year after the French had withdrawn from the Ruhr, and the Treaty of Locarno had guaranteed Germany against any unprovoked aggression by France.

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So much for Herr Hitler's words. What of his deeds? Unhappily the policy of re-armament and of complete re-militarisation in Germany, which Herr Hitler has carried through since coming into power, is only too clearly the corollary of his book.

In particular, the doctrine that "the German Reich must include all Germans" constitutes so obvious a threat to Germany's neighbours—West, South, East and North—that it is leading to widespread re-armament. Austria has adopted conscription; Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, and Roumania are straining their financial resources for the strengthening of their defences, and even Switzerland, with mountain barriers to protect her, is trebling her armaments expenditure, in order to safeguard her neutrality and independence.

Security is also sought in pacts of mutual assistance against aggression, the most important of these being the Franco-Russian Paci. Germany was invited to enter this, but declined.

Another result of this Pan-German propaganda is to be seen in the recent election of three Czechoslovak subjects and four Austrians, to the Reichstag. This apparently accounts for the distinction drawn between "the Reich" and "the German Nation" in paragraph 4 of the German "Peace Plan" of March 31st, 1936. The phrase fully justifies the question asked by the British Government on May 6th, whether Germany intends to respect the existing territorial and political status of Europe, except in so far as this might be later modified by free negotiation and agreement.

But why, it may be asked, have we known so little of the foreign policy of Mein Kampf? To this question there is more than one answer. In the first place, we have to admit that knowledge of foreign languages is not our strong suit, and the study of German has suffered greatly as a result of the war. In the second place, Mein Kampf, in spite of its huge circulation, still costs over 12/- and is long and diffuse.

But the main reason undoubtedly is the severe expurgation of the English version of the book. This was first published in October 1933, under the title of My Struggle, and effectively bars the way to the publication of a faithful English translation. My Struggle contains none of the passages which most clearly reveal Herr Hitler's policy, or, if it attempts to reproduce them, it does so in most cases in a form so mutilated or mis-translated as to leave in them little or nothing of their original meaning.

A notable instance of mistranslation, for instance, occurs on page 242, where there appears what purports to be a translation of a passage from page 689 of the German text. This runs:—

"Denn unterdrueckte Laender werden night durch flammende Proteste in den Schoss eines gemeinsamen Reiches zurueckgefuehrt, sondern durch ein schlagkraeftiges Schwert."

An English translation of this sentence is given below on page 13. Its last words—and, of course, the key words—are "durch ein schlagkraeftiges Schwert" ("by the stroke of a mighty sword"). In My Struggle these words are translated: "by a power, or combination of powers." Can euphemism further go?

So it comes about that My Struggle is only about one-third of the length of Mein Kampf, that it gives no hint of the important omissions from its text, and that it unblushingly mistranslates passages of which an accurate rendering would have been disconcerting to English readers.

No one, therefore, who reads My Struggle can have any idea of the foreign policy set forth in the original. The English version, though published at as high a price as 18/-, ran through no less than teneditions between October, 1933 and January, 1934. It can now be obtained for 3/6d., and may be expected to have an even larger circulation in future.

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A version published for American readers fails, I understand, as completely as this misleading English book to reproduce the original. The English-speaking world is therefore for the most part in complete ignorance of the foreign policy laid down in the Nazi

Bible.

On the other hand, when an unabridged translation of Mein Kampf was published in France, its author took legal steps to stop its circulation.

The menacing situation in Europe, of which the rearmament of Germany is the dominating factor, makes it all-important that English readers should be acquainted with the foreign policy set forth in Mein Kampf. But to wade through the 782 pages of the original might be, even for those who read German, too strenuous a task. I, therefore, earnestly hope that those into whose hands this pamphlet may come will read the pages that follow. It is, I feel, essential that the negotiations now in prospect should be followed by us all with as full a knowledge as possible of the book which Herr Alfred Rosenberg, Head of the Nazi Party's Foreign Department and Leader of Culture for the Reich, declared in the Voelkischer Beobachter of July 18th, 1935, "represents for all future days the unshakable basis of National-Socialist feeling and thought for to-day, tomorrow and the days beyond".

KATHARINE ATHOLL.

London, May 1936.

GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY

by

ADOLF HITLER.

The object of this pamphlet is to set down as completely as possible all that Herr Hitler has written in his autobiography "Mein Kampf" about Foreign Policy and international relations. To this end the whole of his book has been carefully examined and all relevant passages brought together and verified as appearing in the latest edition of 1935.

The following extracts, it may be reasonably assumed, include everything of material importance on this subject. For convenience and perhaps greater lucidity we have grouped his ideas under the following headings:

- I. GENERAL AIMS AND METHODS.
- II. A PAN-GERMAN POLICY.
- III. THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORIES: OLD AND NEW.
- IV. Alliances Essential for the Overthrow of France.
- V. VIEWS ON PEACE AND PACIFISM.

This order is observed in the analysis which follows. Passages of special importance are indicated in heavy type.

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I. GENERAL AIMS AND METHODS.

Meditating on the fallen greatness of Germany, Herr Hitler wrote:—

GERMANY AS A WORLD POWER.

"Germany is no more a World Power, and this is so (gleich-gueltig) whether it be strong or weak in a military sense."

(p. 731).

He prophecies:

"Germany will become a World Power, or it will not be at all. To be a World Power, however, it needs a territory which in the present age would give it the necessary importance, and to its citizens the means of life."

(p. 742).

Foreign policy after the war must seek:

"To give back to the nation its integrity as a liberated Great Power (Machtstaat). This is the basis for the subsequent carrying through of a practical foreign policy which aims at the maintenance, advancement and preservation of our people in the future."

(p. 687).

In the consideration of ways and means to this end, he follows Macchiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck.

"State boundaries are created by men and altered by men. The fact of success by a people in excessive acquisition of territory carries no higher guarantee of eternal approval. It proves at the most the power of the conqueror and the weakness of the victim. It is from this power alone that right is derived. If the German people to-day are cramped in impossible space and look to a wretched future, this is no decree of destiny, but is simply a refusal to stand and offer challenge."

(pp. 740-1).

Again:

"There is only one point of view from which questions of foreign policy have to be considered. Can we expect profit for our own people now or in the future, or will a given course be harmful . . . ? Party political, religious, humane considerations, indeed all other points of view have to be pitilessly eliminated."

(p. 687).

This policy condones "frightfulness":

"The most cruel weapons were humane if they produced a more speedy victory, and those methods alone were satisfactory which helped to secure for the nation the dignity of freedom."

"On the question of war propaganda this was the only possible attitude in such a struggle of life and death."

(p. 190)

The end justifies the means:

"Diplomacy has to see to it that a nation does not perish heroically but maintains itself in a practical way. Every means which leads to this end is justified. To refuse such means could only be characterised as criminal neglect of duty."

(p. 693).

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And the bigger the lie, the more readily will it be believed:

"One acted on the very correct principle that the size of the lie is a definite factor in causing it to be believed, for the vast masses of a nation are in the depths of their hearts more easily deceived than they are consciously and intentionally bad. The primitive simplicity of their minds renders them a more easy prey to a big lie than a small one, for they themselves often tell little lies but would be ashamed to tell big ones. Such a form of lying would never enter their heads. They would never credit to others the possibility of such great impudence as the complete reversal of facts by others. Even explanations would long leave them in doubt and hesitation and any trifling reason would dispose them to accept a thing as true. Something therefore always remains and sticks from the most impudent lies, a fact which all bodies and individuals concerned in the art of lying in this world know only too well, and hence they stop and nothing to achieve this end."

(pp. 252-53).

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II. A PAN-GERMAN POLICY.

The time spent by Herr Hitler in Vienna in early manhood was eventful in shaping the main features of his political thinking—his anti-Semitism, anti-Marxism, hatred of separate and political Austria, and his pan-Germanism. Concerning Austria he writes:

"The fate of this State (Austria) is so closely bound up with the life and growth of the German people as a whole, that a division of history into German history and Austrian history seems to be quite unthinkable."

(p. 11).

It was in this period that he envisaged the union of Austria with the Fatherland:

"But in the end I wanted to be allowed to work in that country from which my heart's most ardent desire must one day be fulfilled : the union of my beloved homeland to the common Fatherland, the German Reich."

(p. 136).

He does not want, however, to shed German blood for the return of the Tyrol to Austria:

".... I believe on the contrary, that if this blood is one day to be shed, it would be a crime to shed it for two-hundred-thousand Germans whilst next door more than seven-millions languish under the foreign yoke and whilst German vitality is threatened by African negro hordes."

(p. 711).

Pan-Germanism must take precedence of colonies:

"German Austria must return again to the great German Fatherland; this not for any kind of economic considerations. No, even if this union from an economic point of view were of no importance, or even if it were injurious, yet it must take place. The same blood belongs to a single Empire. The German people possesses no moral right to colonial activity so long as it is not able to unite its own sons in a common State. Only when the boundaries of the Reich include even the last German . . . does there arise from the need of its own people the moral right to acquire foreign soil. The plough then gives place to the sword and out of the tears of war springs daily bread for posterity."

(p. 1).

THE THIRD REICH OF THE FUTURE.

"The German Reich as a State must embrace all Germans; its duty is not only to rally and to preserve the most valuable original racial elements, but to lead them onwards, slowly, but surely, to a position of dominance."

(p. 439).



III. THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORIES, OLD AND NEW.

Her Hitler criticises the German foreign policy which culminated in the war of 1914-1918. Its task, he states, was:

"To safeguard the food supplies of our people and their children on this planet by preparing the ways which might lead to this end; the necessary help in the form of suitable allies had to be won"

(p. 687).

WIDER BOUNDARIES OR WIDER COMMERCE.

"There remained two possibilities to secure work and bread for an increasing population; either to acquire new land in order to dispose annually of the surplus millions and thus to go on preserving the nation on a basis of self-support, or to change-over to production for foreign needs by means of industry and commerce, in order to get a living from the proceeds The latter method was definitely adopted. The sounder course, however, would have been the former.

"The acquisition of new territory for the settlement of a growing population has very many advantages, especially when the future and not merely the present is kept in mind."

(p. 151).

And again:

"The right way at that time would have been to strengthen the Continental power by winning new territory in Europe, to which, at a later date, could have been added colonial territories within the limits of the naturally attainable. Such a

policy would only have been possible in alliance with England, or under the pressure of such an abnormal military power as would have pushed cultural duties into the background for forty or fifty years."

(pp. 689-90).

The territories lost in 1919 can only be regained by the sword:

"Let us make up our minds that we shall never win back the lost territory by solemn invocation of the Lord, or by pious hopes based on the League of Nations, but only by force of arms."

(b. 708).

"To-day, I am led by the sober consideration that lost territories are not won back by the volubility of Parliamentary gas-bags, but must be won by a sharpened sword, that is, by bloody struggle."

(p. 710).

And again:

"It is worse for a people of one-hundred millions, as the price of maintaining its political solidarity, to endure the yoke of slavery than it is for them to be destroyed but with a part of

them in possession of their full freedom

"We have further to consider that the question of recovery of lost territory of a country and people is always first of all a question of the motherland regaining its political power and independence. In such a case the interest in the restoration of lost territory must be ruthlessly subordinated to the primary task of the recovery of the freedom of the main territory. The liberation of suppressed sections of a nation that have been torn away or of whole provinces, never takes place as the result of a desire on the part of the suppressed, or of a protest of those who remained behind. It is achieved solely by means of power on the part of the . . . earlier common Fatherland

"For suppressed countries are not won back to the bosom of the common Reich by flaming protests, but by the stroke of a

mighty sword.

"To forge this sword is the task of the domestic policy of a nation; to see that this work is done in security and to look for companions in arms is the task of its foreign policy."

(bb. 688-9).

THE 1914 FRONTIERS ARE DERIDED:

"The demand for the re-establishment of our frontiers of 1914 is political nonsense... and in its consequences would seem even a political crime. The frontiers of 1914 were far from logical. For they were in reality not at all complete in comprising all the people of German nationality nor reasonable with regard to their military-geographical significance. They were not the result of a well-considered plan but were frontiers momentarily reached in a by no means final political struggle. They were partly the result of a mere game of chance."

Again:

"The frontiers of 1914 are of no importance for the future of the German nation. They were no protection in the past. They would not give us strength in the future

"No, we National Socialists must unwaveringly keep to the aim of our foreign policy: to secure the soil due to the German people on this earth. And this is the only policy which justifies before God and our German posterity the sacrifice of blood"

(pp. 738-39).

Again:

"If the National Socialist Movement is to rise to a great mission for our people in the eyes of history it must boldly and consciously, heedless of 'traditions' and prejudices, march on the road which leads from the present cramped situation to new territory. Thus would come freedom for ever from the danger of either perishing or becoming a slave nation in the service of others."

(pp. 731-2).

Referring to this larger Germany:

"The only satisfactory and healthy situation for the food supply and maintenance of a people is its own adequate territory

"Only a sufficiently large share of this earth secures to a people the freedom of existence."

(p. 728).

In many powerful passages he vindicates a doctrine of expansion:

BY THE POWER OF THE SWORD.

"As our ancestors . . . fought with their lives for the soil on which to-day we live, so in future, no soil, and with it the life of our peoples, will be assigned to us by the grace of a nation, but only by the power of a victorious sword."

(p. 741).

THE RIGHT TO CONQUER NEW SOIL.

"At present it happens to be the case that on this earth there are in existence immense areas of unused land which only await the cultivator. This being so, however, it is also true that this land is not by nature set aside for a certain nation or race as reserve areas for the future. This soil is for that people which is strong enough to seize it and industrious enough to cultivate it.

"Nature knows no political boundaries. First she places life on this globe, and then watches the free inter-play of forces. Then the strongest in courage and industry, as her favourite child, is given the right to be Lord of Existence."

(p. 147).

THE NEW SOIL MUST BE IN EUROPE :

"Such a policy of land acquisition, however, cannot be carried out in some such place as the Cameroons, but is to-day almost exclusively possible only in Europe... It can certainly not be the intention of Heaven to give one people fifty times as much of the soil of this earth as another.... If this earth really has room for all to live, then we ought to be given the land that we need for life.

"This will certainly not be freely done. Here, however, the right of self-preservation comes into operation, and what is not yielded to gentle persuasion will have to be taken by the strong right arm. If our forebears had made their decisions dependent on the same pacifist nonsense as the present generation we should possess to day only one-third of our present territory; a German people, however, would then scarcely have any further concern in Europe. No, thanks to our natural determination to fight for our own existence we possess the two Eastern marches of the Reich and with them that inner strength of State and people which alone has preserved our existence up to the present day."

(b. 152).

The new soil won must be in Russia and her border States:

We start anew where we terminated six Centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the South and to the West of Europe and look Eastwards. In this way we bring to an end the colonial and trade policies of pre-war times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future.

"If we speak of new soil we can but think first of Russia and her subject border states."

(p. 742).

A pre-war alliance with England would have facilitated this. The colonial policy of Wilhelm II. was, therefore, a mistake:

"In the Nineteenth Century, colonial territory could no longer be obtained by peaceful methods. Therefore such a colonial policy could only have been carried out by a hard struggle, which it would have been better to wage for land inside Europe than outside it.

"Such a decision, however, would certainly demand undivided devotion. It would not do to approach with half measures of with hesitation a task which can be carried through only by the utmost exertion. The whole political leadership of the Reich should have dedicated itself to this exclusive aim

"It had to be understood that this aim could only have been attained by struggle; keeping this in mind the fact of ordeal by battle had to be faced with calm and composure.

"Thus all alliances had to be examined and their use determined exclusively from this point of view. If one wanted territory in Europe, then on the whole this could be got only at the expense of Russia. Hence the new Reich had to set out marching once more along the road of our former Knights of the Teutonic

Order, so as to provide with the German sword a terrain for the German plough and daily bread for the Nation.

"For such a policy there was, of course, in Europe, only a single possible ally: England.

"Only with England to cover our rear, would it have been possible to begin the new Teutonic march. Its justification would have been no less valid than was that of our ancestors. None of our pacifists refuse to eat the corn of the East, although the first plough was called 'sword!'

"To gain England's favour no sacrifice should have been too great. We should have denied ourselves colonies and seapower, and have spared British industry from our competition."

(p. 153-54).

The National Socialist Revolution in Germany would provide a new opportunity:

"Providence herself seems to point us the way. In delivering Russia over to Bolshevism it has robbed the Russian people of its intelligentsia who, until then, had brought about and established its existence as a State."

(p. 742).

Again, as to Russia:

"The gigantic Reich of the East is ripe for a collapse. The end of Jewish rule in Russia will be the end of the Russian State. We are privileged by fate to be witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the most powerful justification of the rightness of our national Race theory."

(p. 743)

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IV. ALLIANCES ESSENTIAL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF FRANCE.

The following passages bear upon Alliances and their purpose:

"Let it not be said that one need not think at once of war in case of an alliance with Russia, or if so, that one would be able to make thorough preparations for such war. No. An alliance whose purpose does not comprise the intention to make war, is senseless and worthless. Alliances are made only for fighting. And though the considerations underlying an Alliance may be far ahead in the future, it is nevertheless the prospect of military development which determines the course. Get rid of the idea that any Power enters into an Alliance without such an objective."

(p. 749).

He has hopes of an alliance with England:

"Terrible for Germany as have been and are the consequences of British war policy, it must be admitted that England is today not vitally interested in Germany's destruction, indeed the opposite is true: that British policy must increasingly tend to hold in check the unmeasured French desire for hegemony.

"A policy of alliances is not inspired by past estrangements, but by turning retrospective experience to account. Experience, however, should have taught us that alliances of which the object is negative; suffer from internal weakness. The destinies of peoples (Voelkerschicksale) can only be firmly welded together by the prospect of common success, that is to say, common acquisitions, conquests, in short, a mutual expansion of power."

(p. 697).

He hopes, too, for an alliance with Italy:

"England does not want Germany to be a World Power, but France does not want Germany to be a Power at all; quite an essential difference! To-day, however, we do not fight for a world position, but for the very existence of our Fatherland, for national unity and for the daily bread of our children. If from this viewpoint we look round for allies in Europe, there are only two possible States: England and Italy."

(p. 699).

Of these two desirable Allies, he writes:

"But will the nations with which we want to ally ourselves be able to carry out a policy in their true interest against the will of the deadly enemy of free peoples and National States, the Jew? . . . In one State the power of the present Government can be regarded as so firmly established and as so absolutely serving the interests of the nation, that international Jewish forces can no longer interfere successfully with its political necessities . . . Fascist Italy . . .

"The position of England is more difficult. In this country of the 'freest of all democracies' the Jew is still the almost unrestricted dictator through his influence on public opinion."

(pp. 720-21).

France, however, is not only not a possible ally in Herr Hitler's thought. She is the deadly enemy of Germany:

"There must be full clarity about one thing. The deadly enemy of the German people now is and for ever will be, France It does not matter who rules in France, whether Bourbons or Jacobins, Bonapartists or bourgeois democrats, clerical republicans or red Bolshevists. The ultimate aim of French foreign policy will always be the attempt to seize the Rhine frontier and to secure through the crushing and dismemberment of Germany the possession of this river."

(p. 699).

Again:

"Whatever you do, do it thoroughly (ganz). By spouting against five or ten States, one neglects to concentrate with all one's will and physical power to strike the blow at the heart of our most nefarious opponent, and sacrifices the chance of added allied strength for the time of settlement. Here, too, lies a mission of the National Socialist movement"

(pp. 718-19).

He comments on the advantages of alliances with England and Italy:

"In no way does our approach to England and Italy bring about by itself the danger of war. The only power which might oppose such an alliance, France, would not be in a position to do so. Hence, this alliance would give Germany the possibility of comfortably preparing for the day of reckoning with France, preparations that would have to be made in any case. For the significance of such an alliance lies in the fact that the deadly enemy of our people, France, would be isolated."

(p. 755).

Further, as to France:

"Every Power is our natural ally which finds French domination of the Continent insupportable. No road to such a Power must seem too difficult for us and no sacrifice too great if it only provides the final result of the possibility of overthrowing our grimmest hater, France. Our smaller wounds we can leave to the healing influence of time, provided we find a way completely to be rid of the greatest."

(p.p. 757-8)

But squaring accounts with France is only a necessary prelude to expansion in Eastern Europe:

"Although we realise the necessity of a settlement with France this could not exhaust the aims of our foreign policy. Its only meaning could and will be to protect our rear so as to get more living room for our people in Europe"

(p. 741).

Again:

"As long as the eternal conflict between Germany and France is being carried out, only in the form of German defence against French attack, it will never be settled

"Germany must realise that the will for life of the German nation must no longer be allowed to languish in mere passive defence, but that we must take up an active policy and throw ourselves into a final and decisive fight with France, with the greatest of German aims at stake. Only then will the eternal and unfruitful struggle between us and France be brought to a conclusion; on condition that the annihilation of France be looked upon solely as a means of gaining finally the possibility of expansion for our people. To-day there are eighty million Germans in Europe! The justification of this foreign policy will be acknowledged when after 100 years 250 million Germans will be living on this Continent.

"They will indeed not be jammed together like factory coolies of another world, but, as peasants and workers who, by their creative labour, make life mutually possible."

(bb. 766-7).

Greater hostility is shown to the Jews in France than even to those in England or Italy:

"In England as well as in Italy, the conflict between traditional statesmanship and the intentions of Jewish world finance is evident.

"Only in France do we find the Stock Exchange, the Jews who are its masters, and the chauvinistic national statesmanship working in greater harmony than ever . . . For this reason France is and remains by far Germany's most terrible enemy. This nation, which is becoming more and more polluted by negro marriages and bound up with the aims of Jewish world domination, is a lurking danger to the existence of the white race in Europe . . . The policy of France in Europe goaded by vindictiveness and systematically led by Jews, is a sin against the continuation of the white race. It will one day set against this nation all the spirits of revenge of a coming generation which will have realised that racial dishonour is the mortal sin of mankind.

"The French danger creates the obligation for Germany to put aside all sentiments and to give her hand to those, who menaced like herself, do not want France in domination there are only two allies: England and Italy."

(pp. 704-705).

In the following passage Herr Hitler gives a "Political Testament" for all time to the German Nation:

"Never allow two continental Powers in Europe to arise. Look upon every attempt to organize a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany—even though it be only in the form of a State susceptible of military development—as an attack upon Germany, and think it not alone a right but a duty to prevent such a State from arising, or to smash it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force. Have a care that the strength of our people should be founded not upon colonies but upon the soil of the European home. Never deem the Reich assured if it cannot give all the offspring of our people a bit of land of their own for centuries to come. Never forget that the most sacred rightin this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood shed for this soil."

(p. 754).

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V. VIEWS ON PEACE AND PACIFISM.

Herr Hitler thus expresses his views on principles such as those underlying the League of Nations:

"The old German policy was wrongly determined by dynastic interests. Similarly future policy must not be led by universal sentimental drivel, (Allerweltsgefuhlsduseleien). In particular it is not our task to be the policeman of the notorious 'poor small nations,' but rather soldiers of our own."

(p. 741).

Herr Hitler's habit is to classify Jews, Liberals and Pacifists much in the same category, in discussing his fellow (German) countrymen:

"Our German pacifist remains silent about the deadliest violence done to the nation for the change of such a lot could only be affected by resistance, viz., force, but this would contradict the spirit of his peace organisation. The rest of the world may exploit the solidarity of the international German Socialist; he will accept it with fraternal sympathy and not think of retaliation or even defence, precisely because he is a German

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"Education for democracy, for international socialism, pacifism and so on, is so rigid and exclusive and therefore from its own point of view so purely subjective, that the whole picture of the outside world is influenced by this fundamental idea; whilst the attitude to Germanism wa from youth on only a very objective one. Thus the pacifist, since he subjectively abandons himself completely to his ideas, will always ask first, what is objectively right, when his people . . . however unjustly and fiercely, is threatened. Never will he join the ranks of his own herd and fight with it."

(p. 122).

The German Pacifist lacks good Nordic blood:

"If the German people had possessed that safe herd instinct based on blood the German Reich would probably to-day be mistress of the globe . . . Then perhaps . . . we could have attained what to-day so many misled pacifists hope to get by whining and blubbering : Peace . . upheld not by the olive branches of lacrimonious hired female mourners, but established by the victorious sword of a masternation which leads the world to serve a higher culture."

(pp. 437-8).

War must precede pacifism:

"Indeed, the ideas of pacifism and humanity may be quite good after the supreme race (hoechststehende Mensch) has conquered and subdued the world in such a measure as makes him its exclusive master . . . Therefore, first fight, and then, perhaps,—pacifism." (pp. 315-6).

Again:

"Anyone who really and sincerely would desire the victory of the pacifist idea, should back by every means the conquest of the world by Germans. For if the reverse were to happen, the last pacifist might only too easily die with the last German ... "

(p. 315).

Not only an army, but a military spirit is necessary:

"The question of how to win back German power is not: how can we manufacture arms? Rather it is: how can we

create the spirit which renders a people capable of bearing arms? When this spirit dominates a people, will-power finds a thousand ways, each of which leads to a weapon."

(p. 365).

This is a return to the traditions of Prussia:

"It is precisely Germany itself which was the most striking example of an Empire which had risen on the basis of a pure policy of power. Prussia, the cell which gave birth to the Reich, rose out of a glittering heroism and not from financial operations or commercial affairs, and the Reich itself was but the most magnificent recompense of a policy directed towards power and of the courage of its soldiers."

(p. 169).

Geneva conventions have been recently invoked and advocated to mitigate the inhumanities of war. Herr Hitler's book, however, maintains the Prussian traditions:

"When nations struggle for their existence on this planet and the question is raised whether they shall survive or not, all humanitarian and aesthetic considerations are of no avail, for conceptions of this kind are not of the world, but come out of the imagination of men and are bound to that imagination . . . As regards the humanitarian question, Moltke already has explained himself thereon, taking the view that in war humanitarianism consists in executing it with the utmost possible rapidity, and that as a consequence the most brutal methods are the most humanitarian."

(p. 195).

Race-culture will maally achieve the goal:

"A State which, in an age of racial poisoning, devotes itself to the care of its best racial elements, becomes one day lord of the earth."

(b. 782.)

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